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Abstract
We study the impact of anticipated scal policy changes in a Ramsey economy where
agents form long-horizon expectations using adaptive learning. We extend the existing
framework by introducing distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour supply, which makes
agents decisions non-predetermined but more realistic. We detect that the dynamic re-
sponses to anticipated tax changes under learning have oscillatory behaviour that can be
interpreted as self-ful lling waves of optimism and pessimism emerging from systematic fore-
cast errors. Moreover, we demonstrate that these waves can have important implications
for the welfare consequences of scal reforms. (JEL: E32, E62, D84)
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1. Motivation
Nowadays, fiscal policy is usually accompanied by legislation and implementa-
tion lags. These lags create a non-negligible span of time between the announce-
ment and effective date of fiscal policy changes. This gives economic agents the
opportunity to anticipate tax changes. The economic literature denotes this as-
pect of fiscal policy anticipated fiscal policy.1
When agents anticipate, their resulting actions may to some extent depend
on the way they form expectations about the future. The standard assumption of
expectations in economics is perfect-foresight / rational expectations (RE). This
assumption might be questioned on the grounds of its unrealistically strong re-
strictions. One prominent deviation of RE that imposes weaker requirements on
the agent’s information set when making his decisions, is the learning literature
(see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for the foundations of this approach). The
main idea is that agents form expectations about the future evolution of contem-
poraneously unobservable variables by engaging in a kind of statistical inference,
when making their economic choices.
Although the learning approach has gained significant popularity in some
areas of macroeconomics, (anticipated) fiscal policy has, until recently, been ne-
glected. A pioneering contribution to the study of anticipated fiscal policy under
learning has been made by Evans et al. (2009). They demonstrate the adaptive
constant gain learning approach in several deterministic economic environments
including the popular Ramsey model. In the this set-up, it is assumed that
agents understand the structure of government financing but have to forecast
1Recently Leeper (2009, p.11ff.) has listed empirical evidence for anticipated fiscal pol-
icy/fiscal foresight and reemphasized the relevance of expectations for sound fiscal policy. Fur-
thermore, Leeper et al. (2009) is another good example of empirical evidence of fiscal foresight.
Therein they also demonstrate the challenges for econometricians that aim to quantify the
impact of fiscal policy actions and at the same time account adequately for fiscal foresight.
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factor-prices on decentralized markets. Their key result is that for an anticipated
balanced-budget permanent tax change the impact effects on key variables un-
der learning are similar to the perfect foresight case, but the transition paths
are remarkably different from the latter. Their result, at least with regard to the
volatility of key variables’ time paths may not come as a surprise. It is well known
that constant gain learning causes excess volatility (see Evans and Honkapohja,
2001, p.49).2
Building on the contribution of Evans et al. (2009), we aim to generalize
their analysis of anticipated fiscal policy under learning by studying an economy
featuring distortionary taxes and elastic labour supply. Thus, our theoretical
key contribution is to derive the dynamic paths of key variables for anticipated
permanent changes in distortionary taxes in the prominent Ramsey model.3
Note that there are fundamental differences between lump-sum taxation and
distortionary taxes such as labour income, capital income, or consumption tax.4
Furthermore, the assumption of elastic labour supply implies that endogenous
variables such as factor prices as well as employment and consumption are not
predetermined as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.), but determined simultaneously.
Thus, one can expect that changes in distortionary taxes may yield dynamics
fundamentally different from the ones in the lump-sum tax case.
One of our main results supports this hypothesis. When we assume that
agents use adaptive learning rules to forecast factor prices, our model predicts
oscillatory dynamic responses to pre-announced permanent tax changes. More-
2In subsequent work, Evans et al. (2010) focus on Ricardian equivalence in the basic Ramsey
model with anticipated fiscal policy under learning. Most important, Evans et al. (2010, p.8ff.)
formally proof that the assumption of RE is not necessary for the Ricardian equivalence result.
3Another extension is to consider stochastic set-ups. Recently, Evans et al. (2011b) have
pioneered the study of anticipated lump-sum tax changes under learning in the RBC model.
4Find the details in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p.323ff.).
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over, the case of distortionary taxation is particularly different with regard to the
effects on impact and the volatility throughout the transition period. The source
of the oscillations are persistent systematic forecast errors, that lead agents to
incorrectly anticipate the effects of pre-announced tax changes. Thus, the oscil-
lations can be interpreted as self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism.
Farmer (1999, p.141ff.) and others have argued that these waves are a feature
of US data and can be replicated by modified RBC models under RE. Evans et al.
(2011b) replicate the waves as a consequence of fiscal policy changes under the
assumption of adaptive learning in the standard RBC model. We demonstrate
that these waves exist even in the deterministic version of this model.
Confronted with this result, we then ask, to what extent the striking differ-
ences in the dynamics between perfect foresight and learning, affect the welfare
consequences of a pre-announced tax reform at the presence of several tax in-
struments. For this purpose, we make use of the welfare measure proposed by
Lucas (1990) and also applied by Cooley and Hansen (1992) (for discrete time),
which takes into account the whole transition path between the initial and new
steady-states associated with initial and changed tax rates.
This welfare analysis is our second key contribution. It links the learning
literature to the part of the public finance literature that is concerned with the
welfare consequences of tax reforms.5 However, the existing literature evaluates
and ranks various distortionary tax reforms according to their welfare conse-
quences under perfect foresight, but do not consider the case of learning. We
fill this gap and illustrate that tax reforms designed to improve welfare, do so
5See Chamley (1981) for an example of a comparative statics analysis, Judd (1987) for
differences in unanticipated and anticipated changes in factor taxes, or Cooley and Hansen
(1992) for a study in a stochastic set-up. Moreover, Garcia-Mila` et al. (2010) have recently
conducted research on welfare consequences of fiscal policy reforms in a heterogeneous agents
model.
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to a much lower extent under learning compared to perfect foresight. Thus, the
learning perspective on tax reforms provides fundamental different insights for
benevolent policy makers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline
the economic model. We use Section 3 to detail our approach of learning and to
derive the equations that govern the dynamics under learning. Section 4 provides
a simple intuitive example of lump-sum tax changes. This section also contains
a sensitivity analysis for some structural parameters. In Section 5 we focus on
distortionary taxation and present a numerical welfare analysis of an exemplary
tax reform. Section 6 concludes and points out directions for further research.
2. The Model
Our economy is a version of the Ramsey economy (see Ljungqvist and Sargent,
2004, p.323ff.). kt evolves according to the economy-wide resource constraint
kt+1 = F (kt, nt)− ct − gt + (1− δ)kt, (1)
where F (kt, nt) is the economy’s production function showing that the firm sec-
tor uses the stock of capital kt and labour nt as inputs to produce the single
good of the economy (see Section 2.2 for the details). Output can be purchased
by households (ct) or the government (gt) or added to kt, which is assumed to
depreciate at a constant rate δ.
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2.1. Households
We assume a continuum of households, where we normalize the size of the
economy to unity and each household faces the problem
max
ct,nt
E∗t
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(ct) + η log(L¯− nt) + φ log(gt)
]}
s.t.(2)
kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
+ (1 + τ ct )ct = (1− τ
l
t )wtnt + (1− τ
k
t )rtkt + (1− δ)kt + bt − τt + pit,(3)
where all variables are in per capita terms. Thus, bt+1 is the level of government
debt holdings chosen in period t. Furthermore, rt is the rental rate of capital and
Rt is the gross real interest rate in period t. Next, τ
•
t denotes a distortionary
tax either on consumption, labour income or capital income6. The real wage in
period t is given by wt and (L¯− nt) denotes leisure. In consequence, nt is labour
supply of the household. τt is a per capita lump-sum tax, and pit = 0 is the
profit under perfect competition among firms. Furthermore, the parameter η ≥ 0
measures the elasticity of labour supply, φ measures the degree of substitution
between private consumption and government spending, see Ambler and Paquet
(1996), and β is the common discount rate. E∗t {•} denotes subjective period t
expectations for future values of variables.7
Given this set-up, the household Euler condition, the usual no-arbitrage condi-
tion for capital and bonds, and the consumption leisure trade-off are respectively
6We use the symbol • as a placeholder throughout our analysis.
7Households apply this operator, if they do not have perfect foresight. This assumption is
commonly used in the learning literature. Furthermore, note that we abstract from aggregate
uncertainty, i.e. we conduct our analysis in a deterministic economy. Thus, if households do not
have perfect foresight, their expectations are so-called point expectations, i.e. agents base their
economic choices on the mean of their expectations, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.61).
In Section 3.1 below we outline our concept of learning. An important aspect of this concept is
that forecasts of single variables are independent of each other. In consequence, we can assume
that for any two variables X and Y it is true that E∗t {XY } = E
∗
t {X}E
∗
t {Y } holds.
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given by
c−1t = βRtE
∗
t
{
c−1t+1
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ ct+1)
}
, (4)
Rt =
[
(1− δ) + (1− E∗t
{
τ kt+1
}
)E∗t {rt+1}
]
, (5)
nt = L¯−
η(1 + τ ct )ct
(1− τ lt )wt
. (6)
2.2. Firms
We assume a unit continuum of firms who compete perfectly. Each firm in
each period t rents capital at given price rt and labour at given price wt and
produces the numeraire good with constant returns to scale production function
yt = F (kt, nt) = Ak
α
t n
(1−α)
t , (7)
where α ∈ (0, 1). The optimal firm behaviour requires that
rt
!
=
∂yt
∂kt
= Aαkα−1t n
1−α
t , (8)
wt
!
=
∂yt
∂nt
= A(1− α)kαt n
−α
t , (9)
i.e. each production factor earns its marginal product. Finally, we have the per
capita national income identity pit = yt − rtkt − wtnt = 0.
2.3. Government
The government finances its expenses on goods and debt repayment by tax
revenues and the issuance of new bonds in each period t,
gt + bt = τ
c
t ct + τ
l
twtnt + τ
k
t rtkt + τt +
bt+1
Rt
.
6
For the remainder, we will assume that the government operates a balanced-
budget rule in each period t, thus tax revenues will fully cover expenses such that
bonds are in zero net supply as a direct consequence. Thus, in each period t the
government sets gt, τ
c
t , τ
l
t , τ
k
t and τt constrained by
gt = τ
c
t ct + τ
l
twtnt + τ
k
t rtkt + τt. (10)
3. Learning and Learning Dynamics
3.1. Learning
The concept of learning applied herein was elaborated first in Evans et al.
(2009, p.943ff.). For completeness we restate the crucial assumptions. Under
learning, households are supposed to know the entire history of endogenous vari-
ables. They observe the current period value of exogenous variables and they
know the state variables. Furthermore, they know the structure of the economy
with regard to the fiscal policy sector. Agents understand the implications of any
pre-announced policy change for the government budget constraint. They are
also convinced that the intertemporal government budget constraint will always
hold (see Evans et al., 2009, p.944). We assume decentralized markets for labour
and capital, where agents are not in possession of perfect foresight. Actual factor
prices are not observable. Thus, agents forecast factor prices ret+j(t) and w
e
t+j(t)
for j ≥ 1, by a constant-gain steady-state adaptive learning rule8
zet+j(t) = z
e(t) = re(t− 1) + γ(zt−1 − z
e(t− 1)), (11)
8Here we apply the same short-hand notation as Evans et al. (2009). Thus for any variable
say z, its period t expected future value in period t + j derived by a learning rule may either
be denoted E∗t {zt+j} or equivalently z
e
t+j(t). An additional notation we introduce is z
p
t+j(t),
which denotes the agent’s planned choice of the variable z in period t + j based on expected
values formed via the learning rule in period t.
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where 0 < γ ≤ 1 is the gain parameter.9 Our choice of this specific learning rule is
motivated by two well known arguments in the learning literature. First, as Evans
and Honkapohja (2001, p.332) outline, choosing a constant gain learning rule is
the appropriate choice for agents, when they are aware of structural change, as in
such a learning rule agents discount past data exponentially. Note that rule (11)
is equivalent to ze(t) = γ
∑
∞
i=0(1−γ)
izt−i−1.
10 Second, the timing of the learning
rule, i.e. that agents’ update in period t uses data up to period t− 1, is chosen in
order to avoid simultaneity between re(t) and rt as well as w
e(t) and wt (see for
example Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, p.51). Simultaneity in this context means
that agents’ expectations affect current values of aggregate endogenous variables
and vice versa, which could introduce strategic behaviour.
Such a learning rule yields a sequence of so-called temporary equilibria, which
consist of sequences of (planned) time paths for all endogenous variables. These
sequences satisfy the learning rule above, the expectation history, household and
firm optimality conditions, the government budget constraint, and the economy-
wide resource constraint given the exogenous variables as well as the current stock
of capital in each period. These plans are revisited and potentially altered in each
period after expectations have been updated.
3.2. Learning Dynamics With Distortionary Taxation
Now, we derive the dynamic paths under learning in presence of multiple
types of taxes, i.e. τ ct , τ
l
t , τ
k
t ∈ [0, 1] and τt 6= 0 for all t. Equations (4)-(5) yield
c−1t = β(c
p
t+1(t))
−1
[
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ c,et+1(t))
]
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k,et+1(t))r
e
t+1(t)]
9The gain parameter measures the responsiveness of the forecast to new observations, see
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.18). Be aware that in our model the gain parameter is exoge-
nous. See Branch and Evans (2007) for an example where agents choose the gain parameter.
10The learning rule is similar to a exponential smoothing method.
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and forward substitution of this expression yields
c
p
t+j(t) = β
jD
k,e
t,t+j(t)
[
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ c,et+j(t))
]
ct, (12)
where we define Dk,et,t+j(t) ≡ Π
j
i=1[(1− δ) + (1− τ
k,e
t+i(t))r
e
t+i(t)]. One can think of
this term as “expectations of the interest rate factor Dt,t+j at time t” (see Evans
et al., 2009, p.933). Furthermore, notice that the consumption leisure trade-off is
now given by (6). If agents plan to satisfy an adequate transversality condition
lim
T 7→∞
(
D
k,e
t,t+T (t)
)
−1
k
p
t+T+1(t) = 0, (13)
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
(1 + τ ct )ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
(1 + τ c,et+j(t))c
p
t+j(t) = [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
t )rt]kt
+(1− τ lt )wtnt − τt +
∞∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
[(1− τ l,et+j(t))w
e
t+j(t)n
p
t+j(t)− τ
e
t+j(t)],
which by the virtue of (12) as well as (6) yields the consumption function
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)(1 + τ ct )
[(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt + (1− τ
l
t )wtL¯− τt
+SW2 − ST2 − ST3, where (14)
SW2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯, (15)
ST2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
τ
l,e
t+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯, and (16)
ST3 =
∞∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t) (17)
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are the expected present value of labour income, the labour income taxes and
lump-sum taxes in turn.
We now need to think about the policy experiment we will study. We are
looking at a scenario of a credible permanent (simultaneous) change in (some)
taxes announced at the outset of period t = 1 and effective from period t = Tp
onwards. The dynamics under perfect foresight are standard.11 Under learning,
given that households know the future path of taxes, they can explicitly calculate
SW2, ST2, and ST3.
12 Given a calibration of the structural parameters, we can
then compute the dynamics responses for ct and the other endogenous variables.
4. A Simple Intuitive Example: Lump-Sum Tax Increase
We would like to illustrate the applied methodology for the simple case of
lump-sum taxation (τ ct = τ
l
t = τ
k
t = 0) for three reasons: first, the rather complex
consumption function (14)-(17) under learning simplifies in this case and facili-
tates to develop some intuition; second, we want to illustrate the consequences of
the introduction of elastic labour supply compared to the case of inelastic labour
supply as assumed in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) and its effect on the dynamic
paths of the key variables such as ct and kt, given their calibration (see Table 1
below); third, below in Subsection 4.2, we aim to present a sensitivity analysis
for the very basic version of the model to deepen the intuition for the impact of
the learning parameters on the dynamics.
11Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p.323ff.) illustrate the analytical derivations and numerical
simulation alternatives for the perfect foresight case. We will simply make use of the DYNARE
toolbox throughout all calculations to compute dynamics under perfect foresight. Note that
this toolbox employs linearization methods.
12See Appendices A.1, A.2, and A.3 for details.
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For an anticipated lump-sum tax change under learning (14) simplyfies to
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
{[(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯− τ0 + SW1 − ST1}, (18)
where the expected present value of labour income is given by
SW1 =
∞∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯ =
we(t)L¯
re(t)− δ
, (19)
and the expected present value of lump-sum taxes is given by ST1 =
∞∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t) =


τ0
re(t)−δ
+ (τ1 − τ0)
[(1−δ)+re(t)]t−Tp
1−[(1−δ)+re(t)]−1
for 1 ≤ t < Tp
τ1
re(t)−δ
for t ≥ Tp.
(20)
4.1. Inelastic Labour Supply vs. Elastic Labour Supply
We believe that it is of importance to use a model that features elastic labour
supply in order to study the implications of fiscal policy reforms adequately.
Completely inelastic labour supply is a quite unrealistic assumption itself and at
least some moderately elastic labour supply should be considered.13 Moreover,
inelastic labour supply implies that agents’ choices of current period endogenous
variables are in fact predetermined as is pointed out in Evans et al. (2009, p.944).
In order to illustrate differences in the dynamics of endogenous variables based on
the assumption of inelastic and elastic labour supply, we return to the simulation
exercise of Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.).14 The calibration for this subsection is
given in Table 1 below.15 The policy experiment considered in Evans et al. (2009,
13The empirical evidence discussed in Chetty et al. (2012) suggests η ≈ 4.
14Note that τ ct = τ
l
t = τ
k
t = δ = 0 and η = 0 imply that nt = L¯ (i.e. inelastic labour supply)
for all t. Therefore, we are exactly in the same scenario as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.).
15Note that we do not fully agree with the calibration of Evans et al. (2009), but we will
stick to their calibration in this subsection to keep our results comparable. The basic reason
11
Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 20
β 0.95 γ 0.10
φ 0.00
Table 1: Parameters similar as in Evans et al. (2009, p.945).
p.943ff.) is a permanent increase in government purchases from g0 = τ0 = 0.9 to
g1 = τ1 = 1.1 that is announced credibly in period t = 1 and will be effective
from period Tp = 20 onwards. It is assumed that the economy is in steady-state
in period t = 0. Simulations in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for consumption
and capital are recalculated (with η = 0, L¯ = 0.5182) and displayed in Figures
1(a) and 1(b) below. Next, Figures 1(c) and 1(d) exhibit the dynamics for elastic
labour supply (with η = 2.00, L¯ = 1.00) such that n0 = 0.5182 and g0 = 0.9.
Two distinct features emerge from Figure 1. First, when we compare the
dynamic paths of ct, as well as kt, under perfect foresight and learning, they
are different from each other no matter with or without elastic labour supply.
Therefore, it may be quite important to consider learning when evaluating fiscal
policies as learning is a more realistic assumption of human behaviour from our
point of view.16 Second, obviously the learning paths in Figures 1(a) and 1(b)
for inelastic labour supply are strikingly different to the ones under elastic labour
supply in Figures 1(c) and 1(d). In particular, elastic labour supply yields more
volatility in the time paths of ct and kt (as well as other variables in the model)
compared to the inelastic labour supply case. In fact, the variables oscillate
for this disagreement is the combination of parameters β = 0.95 and Tp = 20. These parameter
choices imply that a government, which in reality is usually in charge of a legislation period
of four to six years, may announce a tax policy change that will be effective in 20 years’ time.
From our perception of political execution and our confidence in fiscal policy makers’ ability to
commit, this appears to be unrealistic in most cases.
16This is the core message of Evans et al. (2009).
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Figure 1: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid curve)
and perfect foresight (dashed curve) with inelastic labour supply as in
Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) as well as consumption (c) and capital (d)
dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed
curve) with elastic labour supply. The dotted horizontal line indicates
the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp.
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around their steady-state until they converge to it.
In order to develop some intuition for the transition dynamics illustrated in
Figure 1, we start with the familiar case of perfect foresight.17 Given inelastic
labour supply, agents respond to the credible pre-announced tax increase with
a decrease in ct on impact. The policy change means a negative wealth effect
to the agents, as expected future taxes increase. Due to their perfect foresight,
they precisely quantify this negative wealth effect. In the subsequent period,
this increases kt beyond its steady-state equilibrium value. Out of the steady-
state equilibrium, the transitional dynamics lead to a further decrease in ct and a
temporary investment boom that increases kt throughout the pre-implementation
period. The rise in kt affects marginal products and increases wt, decreases rt, and
increases yt. Once the policy change becomes effective in Tp, the levels of ct and
kt are consistent with the new saddle-path and thereafter decrease monotonically
to the new steady-state equilibrium. The evolution of wt, rt, and yt is reversed
and they converge monotonically to their respective steady-state values.
Also under learning, agents anticipate a negative wealth effect, and decrease
ct on impact. However, they do so to a lower extent, as they are not able to
precisely quantify the negative wealth effect. The reason is that their expectations
about factor prices are predetermined point estimates. In fact, on impact they
project the initial steady state values into the entire future. Thereby they are
too pessimistic about we(t) and too optimistic about re(t). The latter induces
them to underestimate the present value of future taxes, as one can see from (20).
However, the negative impact effect on ct causes an investment boom that yields
an increase in kt during the pre-implementation period. A higher kt also yields a
higher level of yt. Moreover, via marginal products wt increases and rt decreases.
17Our intuition is developed along the lines of Evans et al. (2011b) and the references therein.
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Now, these changes in factor prices, in turn affect ct via two distinct channels,
as (18) makes clear. First, there is a direct effect on ct. A higher wt can increase ct
and a lower rt can decrease ct. However, the net effect in our case is positive. Sec-
ond, there is a self-fullfilling channel. The changes in actual factor prices trigger
a learning process due to systematic forecast errors. Rule (11) leads to upward
revisions of we(t) and downward revisions of re(t). The consumption function
(18) makes clear that this leads to an increase in the sum of expected future
labour income and taxes, where the increase in the former outweighs the increase
in the latter. Thus, ct also increases via this channel in the pre-implementation
period.
When the increase in lump-sum taxes becomes effective in period Tp, the
consumption function (18) indicates that it is almost fully anticipated by that
date. Only the self-fulfilling channel, due to its persistence, is weakly driving up
ct. Thus, the tax increase mostly materializes in a drop in kt via (1).
Throughout the post-implementation period, yt decreases due to the shrinking
kt. In addition, wt decreases and rt increases. Over time, this yields downward
revisions of we(t) and upward revisions of re(t). This reverses the evolution of ct
and decreases it. In the long run, the self-fullfilling channel gains importance. If
agents manage to learn the new steady-state factor prices by continuous upward
and downward revisions of factor prices, the economy eventually converges to the
new steady-state.
In principal, the convergence is characterized by a sequence of waves of op-
timism and pessimism about factor prices and other variables in consequence.
The only reason, why those waves are not very apparent in the learning paths in
Panels 1(a)-1(b) is the particular calibration, as we will argue in Subsection 4.2
below.
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In the case of elastic labour supply under perfect foresight, the dynamics are
qualitatively similar to the ones with inelastic labour supply, which is well known
from the standard Ramsey model. However, under learning, elastic labour supply
has two major consequences. First, the impact effect on ct is smaller, as η ≥ 0
lowers the initial drop via (18). Second, actual factor prices and expectations
about factor prices affect both ct and nt. The latter two are substitutes, and
therefore the evolution of nt is now subject to two opposing influences. Everything
else equal, first, nt tends to the opposite direction of ct. Thus, given the drop in
ct on impact, households increase nt, as can be seen from (6). Second, nt in turn,
now affects actual factor prices. On impact, the increase in nt not only increases
rt and yt, but decreases wt, which in turn lowers nt.
Lower ct and larger yt again create an investment boom before Tp. The intu-
ition throughout the pre-implementation, implementation and post-implementation
period is similar to the case of inelastic labour supply. However, now actual factor
prices are exposed to two potentially opposing influences via kt and nt.
Nevertheless, the self-fulfilling channel is quantitatively more important right
away and oscillations are amplified. The reason is that actual factor prices now re-
act on impact, and expectations therefore already react in the period afterwards.
In particular, we(t) are first lowered, and, once the investment boom materializes,
upward revised even in the pre-implementation period. Likewise, re(t) are first
increased and subsequently downward revised, even before Tp. These movements
in expectations also explain, why ct decreases further after Tp, before it recovers.
In sum, allowing for elastic labour supply results in amplified oscillations
starting at an earlier date. However, the oscillations remain a feature of the
samples that agents utilize to learn the steady-state values of factor prices and
their resulting persistent and systematic forecast errors.
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4.2. Sensitivity Analysis
Compared to the previous literature, the learning approach herein introduces
two additional structural parameters. One is γ, the gain parameter and a second
one is the implementation date Tp. Therefore, we are interested in how these
parameters affect the dynamics of the economy.
4.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis for the Gain Parameter
There exists no consensus for the choice of γ in the learning literature. We
are only aware of a single empirical estimate provided by Milani (2007, p.2074)
for quarterly frequency and this is γ = 0.0183.18 But a reason to be cautious
to use the estimate of Milani (2007, p.2074) is that it is based on a data set
containing output, inflation and the nominal interest rate, whereas in our setting
agents forecast the rental rate of capital and the real wage. Next, Milani (2007,
p.2074) mentions that a range of γ ∈ [0.01, 0.03] is commonly used. Evans and
Honkapohja (2009, p.154) note a range of γ ∈ [0.01, 0.06] as known estimates.
Below we will present sensitivity of the dynamics under learning for γ ∈
{0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.08, 0.10}.19 We do so for the original numerical analysis of
Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) (L¯ = 1.00, η = 0.00), as in this case, there is inelastic
labour supply and we can focus solely on the possible fluctuations introduced by
varying the gain parameter γ.20
In Figure 2(a) we observe that the smaller γ, the smaller the increase in ct
until Tp (after the initial drop). Furthermore, as we recognize from Figure 2(b),
the smaller γ, the larger the increase in kt until Tp. However, in both Figure 2(a)
and 2(b), we observe that, after Tp, with decreasing γ the dynamics fluctuate
18This number indicates that agents use approximately 1/γ ≈ 55 quarters of data.
19Values in the range γ ∈ [0.002, 0.01) do not alter the conclusions in this subsection.
20Note that the two thick lines in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) exactly replicate the Figures 8 and
9 in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.).
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Figure 2: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning and perfect
foresight with inelastic labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.)
for alternating values of γ. The dotted horizontal line indicates the
(new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp.
around the steady-state with increasing amplitude and convergence slows down.
These observations are partly at odds with what Evans and Honkapohja (2001,
p.332) report for the statistical literature: “a larger gain is better at tracking
changes but at the cost of a larger variance”. In our case it holds, that a smaller
gain yields larger volatility.21
Inspection of the learning rule (11) explains this fact. The term (1 − γ)i
indicates that a smaller γ, means stronger discounting of past observations.
Thus, with a smaller γ, agents have more confidence in their initial expectations.
Throughout the pre-implementation period, a smaller γ means less optimism
about SW1 and approximately similar pessimism about ST1. In consequence,
the temporary increase of ct is lower and the temporary investment boom peaks
21Evans et al. (2011a, p.23) confirm this observation with us in a similar model under eductive
learning. Both papers study a deterministic multivariate economy with capital accumulation,
where agents form point expectations over an infinite-horizon. Exactly this combination of
features distinguishes them from the existing literature, such as the references in Evans et al.
(2011a, p.23), which reports the opposite result, and may be the starting point for providing a
general explanation as the result of future research.
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at a higher level of kt. Moreover, a smaller γ yields slower convergence in the
post-implementation period, as the expectational errors are more persistent.
4.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis for the Implementation Date
Next, we examine sensitivity of dynamics under learning for various imple-
mentation dates, in particular Tp ∈ {3, 10, 20}.
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Figure 3: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning with inelastic
labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for alternating values
of Tp and γ = 0.10. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new)
steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp = 20.
In Figure 3(a) we observe that the shorter the distance between the announce-
ment date and Tp, the higher the initial drop in ct and the lower the increase in
ct until Tp thereafter. Next, in Figure 3(b) we observe that with decreasing Tp,
the peaks in kt become smaller, but the learning dynamics remain qualitatively
similar.
Inspection of SW1 and ST1 makes clear that Tp has only a direct impact on
ST1. If Tp decreases, agents are less optimistic about ST1 and reduce ct more
on impact. With lower Tp agents are also less optimistic about ST1 throughout
the pre-implmentation, thus the temporary recovery in ct is dampened, the in-
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vestment boom ends earlier, and convergence speeds up. However, the nature of
dynamics is not seriously affected.
In order to summarize, there are three important insights from the analysis
above. First, there are at least qualitative differences between the case of inelastic
labour supply (η = 0) and elastic labour supply (η > 0). Therefore, if one
regards the latter assumption as more realistic, a model that allows for elastic
labour supply is a more appropriate framework to study anticipated fiscal policy
under learning. Second, our sensitivity analysis suggests that the choice of the
gain parameter γ and the implementation date Tp does not affect the nature
of transition paths so we consider ourselves free to choose any of the values
considered in the sensitivity analysis.22 Finally and most notably, we observed
at least a qualitative difference in the dynamics under learning compared to the
dynamics under perfect foresight. The former appear to be much more volatile
than the latter. This stylized fact motivates the quantification and comparison of
welfare effects of anticipated fiscal policy reforms under learning and RE below.
5. The Case of Distortionary Taxation
Herein we are utilizing our derivations from Subsection 3.2 to conduct an
exemplary tax reform. Our calibration now is given by Table 2. In particular,
we consider a credible pre-announced cut in τ kt and adjust τ
l
t such that the new
steady-state government revenue is the same as before the policy change. The
change is effective in Tp = 8, which will correspond to a duration of 2 years.
23
22In particular, in the subsequent analysis, we will choose γ = 0.08 and Tp = 8, which will
correspond to 8 quarters.
23This reform is comparable to the ones of Judd (1987), Lucas (1990), or Cooley and Hansen
(1992). According to this literature, such a reform yields a welfare improvement. The learning
perspective, despite its empirical support (see for example Milani (2011)), is unknown.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.025
α 0.33 Tp 8
β 0.985 γ 0.08
η 4.00 L¯ 0.15
φ 0.30
Table 2: Model calibration for the tax reform.
Moreover, we assume that the budget is balanced in each period and that gt =
g¯ = 0.25. Thus, we require τt to adjust throughout the transition.
We evaluate the tax reform by welfare measures, which are computed following
the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.).24 Intuitively speaking, we
compute the increase in consumption that an individual would require to be
as well off as under the equilibrium allocation without taxes. We express that
number in percentage of output. Non-zero tax rates as chosen according to Table
3 lead to distortions and reveals that the steady-state welfare loss due to our
initially chosen tax rates amounts to W0 = 4.75%.
The particular tax reform is a credible pre-announced cut in τ k0 to τ
k
1 =
0.25 and an adequate increase in τ l1. Figure 4 indicates that the dynamics are
familiar to ones observed for the simple example discussed above. Note the new
steady-state ct is higher and nt is lower. This can be explained by the more
severe distortions due to a larger τ l1. Next, Table 3 reveals that the reform yields
a considerable welfare gain if agents have perfect foresight. The welfare loss
decreases by 75.6% to WP1 = 1.16%. However, the welfare loss under learning,
WL1 = 4.52%, indicates that the reform does not yield large welfare improvements
when agents lack perfect foresight.
Some intuition for the transitory dynamics and the welfare loss can be devel-
24We detail the computation in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid curve)
and perfect foresight (dashed curve). The dotted horizontal line indi-
cates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates Tp.
oped. Under perfect foresight, it is well known that, on impact, the pre-announced
cut in τ k0 yields to a drop in ct and therefore to an increase in nt. This increases
rt as well as yt, and decreases wt on impact. Agents anticipate that saving is
more attractive in the future and that this will have a positive net effect on
wealth. Therefore agents start accumulating kt right away. The responses of
non-predetermined variables to the simultaneously pre-announced increase in τ lt
are in line with these impact effects. Subsequent accumulation of kt yields in-
creases in wt and yt and a decrease in rt. The monotonic evolution of variables
continues until the saddle-path is reached in Tp. Thereafter, ct and kt monotoni-
cally increase to the new steady-state. The increase in ct yields a decrease in nt,
that in turn decreases rt and increases wt. The sustained growth in kt causes yt to
grow as well until the new steady-state is reached. Finally, constant government
expenditures imply that there is no kink in the evolution of kt in Tp.
Under learning, agents again make mistakes, when anticipating the effects
of the policy change. They underestimate the positive net effect on wealth.
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However, as a feature of their sample and the learning rule (11), agents start
forming either too optimistic or too pessimistic expectations about factor prices
via the self-fulfilling channel, which has similar consequences throughout the
pre- and post-implementation period as discussed above in Section 4. Thus, we
observe waves of optimism and pessimism until the economy eventually converges
to the new steady-state. Exactly those waves generated by systematic forecast
errors cause excessive volatility of the economy and in turn are the source for the
low welfare gain of the tax reform.
In sum, the tax reform indicates that the resulting welfare improvements of
an anticipated tax reform might be much smaller in magnitude under learning
compared to its improvements under perfect foresight.
Tax Reform
τ0 → τ1 0.1596
τ k0 → τ
k
1 0.5000 ց 0.2500
τ l0 → τ
l
1 0.2300 ր 0.3180
τ c0 → τ
c
1 0.0500
W0 → W
P
1 0.0475 ց 0.0116
W0 → W
L
1 0.0475 ց 0.0452
Table 3: Simulation results for the tax reform. The initial tax rates are the same
as in Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.305) except for the consumption tax.
The latter is chosen as in Giannitsarou (2007, p.1433).
6. Conclusion
We demonstrate within the Ramsey model that the responses to anticipated
permanent tax changes when agents learn are remarkably different compared
to their counterparts under perfect foresight. The learning dynamics appear to
oscillate around the steady-state to which they converge slowly. Thus, there is
more volatility under learning.
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We argue that the observed oscillations are related to expectational errors.
These systematic forecast errors are caused by the anticipated permanent tax
change and lead agents to incorrectly quantify the effects of tax reforms on their
life-time wealth. The persistence of the expectational errors in the learning rule
of the agents is the fundamental reason for agents to alternately be either too
optimistic or too pessimistic about the consequences of a pre-announced tax
change.
These learning dynamics, despite the simplicity of the model, have the poten-
tial to capture important features of the empirical evidence on how the economy
responds to policy changes. However, we believe that future research in this area
needs to come up with more empirical evidence on whether or how agents learn
about fiscal policy.
Apart from this, our sensitivity analyses show that a smaller gain parameter
leads to higher volatility. This result is at odds with conventional wisdom about
the link between the gain parameter and the dynamic responses in the literature
and requires further investigation as well.
Finally, an exemplary tax reform indicates that the magnitude of welfare
improvements appears to be substantially lower under the assumption of learning
compared to the case of perfect foresight. This can be explained by the oscillations
under learning. Thus, the learning perspective on the tax reform considered
herein has a more general implication for benevolent policy makers. Tax reforms
may not lead to a considerable aggregate welfare improvement compared to the
status quo. In consequence, other criteria, like the distributional consequences
of tax reforms in presence of heterogeneity, may become more important in the
design of such tax reforms.
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A. Model Derivations
A.1. Derivation of SW2
We start from (15), i.e.
∑
∞
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯. Next, we recall the definition
of Dk,et,t+j(t). Given the learning rule (11) we get
D
k,e
t,t+j(t) =


Πji=1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
=
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]j
for τ k,et+j(t) = τ
k
0
Πji=1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
=
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]j
for τ k,et+j(t) = τ
k
1 .
(A.1.1)
for τ k,et+j(t) = τ
k
1 . Thereafter, we split this infinite sum into
SW2 = L¯
[
T−1∑
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
we(t) +
∞∑
j=T
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
we(t)
]
= L¯[
T−1∑
j=1
(
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]j
)−1we(t) +
∞∑
j=T
(
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]j
)−1we(t) ],
or
SW2 =
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
] T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)j
+
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
] ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)j
.
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Now we exploit the properties of a geometric series, e.g.
∑n
j=m f
j = f
n+1
−fm
f−1
for
some constant f , and derive
SW2 =
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
(
1−
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]1−T
1−
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)
+
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
( [
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]1−T
1−
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)
.
When we respect the timing outlined in the experiment above, we get (15)
SW2 =


we(t)L¯
[(1−τk0 )r
e(t)−δ]
+ we(t)L¯
[
[(1−δ)+(1−τk1 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1−[(1−δ)+(1−τk1 )r
e(t)]−1
−
[(1−δ)+(1−τk0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1−[(1−δ)+(1−τk0 )r
e(t)]−1
]
for 1 ≤ t < Tp
we(t)L¯
[(1−τk1 )r
e(t)−δ]
for t ≥ Tp.
A.2. Derivation of ST2
Starting from (16), i.e.
∑
∞
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
τ
l,e
t+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯, for (A.1.1) and τ
l,e
t+j(t) is
either given by τ l0 or τ
l
1, we may again split the infinite sum into
ST2 = w
e(t)L¯×
[
T−1∑
j=1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]j)−1
τ l0 +
∞∑
j=T
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]j)−1
τ l1 ],
=
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
] T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)j
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
] ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)j
.
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Now, the properties of the geometric series allow us to rewrite this as
ST2 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]1−T
− 1[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
− 1
)
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
(
−
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]1−T[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
− 1
)
.
Given the timing outlined above, we get (16)
ST2 =


τ l0 w
e(t)L¯
[(1−τk0 )r
e(t)−δ]
+ we(t)L¯
[
τ l1 [(1−δ)+(1−τ
k
1 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1−[(1−δ)+(1−τk1 )r
e(t)]−1
−
τ l0 [(1−δ)+(1−τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1−[(1−δ)+(1−τk0 )r
e(t)]−1
]
for 1 ≤ t < Tp
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
[(1−τk1 )r
e(t)−δ]
for t ≥ Tp.
A.3. Derivation of ST3
Starting from (17), i.e.
∑
∞
j=1
1
D
k,e
t,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t), given (A.1.1) and τ
e
t+j(t) is either
τ0 or τ1, we again split the infinite sum into
ST3 = [
T−1∑
j=1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]j)−1
τ0 +
∞∑
j=T
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]j)−1
τ1 ],
=
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
[
T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)j
τ0
]
+
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
[
∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
)j
τ1
]
.
Given the properties of geometric series we can rewrite the latter as
ST3 =
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]1−T
− 1[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )r
e(t)
]
−1
− 1
τ0
)
+
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
(
−
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]1−T[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )r
e(t)
]
−1
− 1
τ1
)
.
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Once more, given the timing outlined above, we get (17)
ST3 =


τ0
[(1−τk0 )r
e(t)−δ]
+ [
[(1−δ)+(1−τk1 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1−[(1−δ)+(1−τk1 )r
e(t)]−1
τ1 −
[(1−δ)+(1−τk0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1−[(1−δ)+(1−τk0 )r
e(t)]−1
τ0 ] for 1 ≤ t < Tp
τ1
[(1−τk1 )r
e(t)−δ]
for t ≥ Tp.
B. Computing Welfare Changes
B.1. Comparative Statics
We follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.). Their measure
of welfare change for a given policy change is derived by solving
U0 = log[c1(1 + x
•)] + η log[1− n1] + φ log[g1] (B.1.1)
for x•.25 U0 is the utility a household obtains in the steady-state without any tax.
c1 and n1 are the values of consumption and employment at the new steady-state
after the tax change either under perfect foresight or learning. It follows that
x• =
exp(U0)
c1(1− n1)ηg
φ
1
− 1. (B.1.2)
Thus, in general, we need to solve for x for the perfect foresight dynamics and
another x∗ for the dynamics under learning.26 Given x• we can calculate
W =
△C
y1
=
x•c1
y1
, (B.1.3)
where △C is the restoration value of consumption, which in our case may be
interpreted as the total change in consumption required to restore a household
25x• is either x under perfect foresight or x∗ under learning.
26This must yield the same x = x∗ both under perfect-foresight and under learning, but this
number may be useful to compare different policy experiments.
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to the level of utility obtained under the allocation associated with zero taxes.
y1 is the level of output at the new steady-state.
B.2. Transition Measure
Again we follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) based on
Lucas (1990). Their measure of welfare change accounting for transition given a
policy change is derived by solving
∞∑
t=1
βt {log[ct(1 + x
•)] + η log[1− nt] + φ log[gt]− U0}
!
= 0 (B.2.1)
for x under perfect foresight and x∗ under learning. ct, nt, gt, and yt are period t
consumption, employment, government spending and output respectively, either
under perfect foresight or learning.
x• =

 exp
(
β
(1−β)
[U0 − β
TU1]
)
ΠTt=1c
βt
t × Π
T
t=1 (1− nt)
ηβt × ΠTt=1g
φβt
t


(1−β)
β
− 1. (B.2.2)
Hereby T is the terminal period of the simulation. For the T < t ≤ ∞ it is
assumed that agents’ period utility is approximately given by U1, i.e. all variables
involved are close to their new steady-state value. Thus, T needs to be sufficiently
large such that x• does no longer change significantly. Given x• we can calculate
W• =
∑T
t=1 β
t {x•ct}∑T
t=1 β
t {yt}
, (B.2.3)
which will be reported asW for the perfect foresight dynamics and asW∗ for the
dynamics under learning.
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